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1. Introduction
Richard Swinburne is a prolific author and Christian apologist who, throughout a long 
teaching career and into retirement, has written books (some very technical) covering 
topics in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and especially the philosophy of religion. 
He sometimes attempts to add clarity and rigor to his arguments by providing estimates 
for probabilities in Bayes’s theorem to engender posterior probability estimates for the 
hypothesis being defended in the book. We will consider central arguments in two of 
Swinburne’s key works, the first editions of which were introduced over a span of twelve 
years: Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy (1991) and The Resurrection of God Incar-
nate (2003).
After summarizing his central arguments in sections 2 and 3, I will focus on three weak-
nesses that are clearly exhibited in these books. We will see that, partly because of these 
weaknesses, Swinburne’s estimates for the probabilities in Bayes’s theorem are unreliable. 
Furthermore, I will show that Swinburne’s hypothesis in his argument for the resurrec-
tion of God incarnate does not allow for a reasonable assessment of the resurrection 
hypothesis itself. While a working knowledge of Bayes’s theorem is helpful, especially in 
section 7, it will be referred to sparingly throughout most of this review. I will introduce 
Bayes’s theorem presently, and I will attempt to clarify its use via an example. The main 
weaknesses in Swinburne’s arguments are addressed in sections 4–6 and can be appreci-
ated without an understanding of Bayes’s theorem.
In his book The Existence of God (hereafter EG), Swinburne produces a set of arguments 
that he believes makes a good probabilistic case for the existence of God—and not mere-
ly any god.1 His God hypothesis relies on simplicity, as he understands it. It is simpler 
to posit that God’s power and knowledge will be exhausted than it is to constrain one 
or both of these attributes arbitrarily (EG, 97). Since (he maintains) moral judgments 
have truth values and God would have no temptations to perform an immoral act, an 
omniscient being will know the moral facts and abide by them. So God is also morally 
perfect (EG, 105). While I will not discuss the merits of Swinburne’s arguments in EG in 
this review, I will, for the sake of argument, accept his conclusion that the existence of a 
god of Swinburne’s description is greater than fifty percent. Given Swinburne’s clear and 
thorough discussion of Bayes’s theorem in EG, I will also use EG as the resource for the 
following elucidation of the theorem.
In order to express his case with something like scientific precision, while also acknowl-
edging that our subjective assessment of argument cogency precludes us from placing 
1  Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004).
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numerical values for the probabilities with exactitude, Swinburne frequently uses a ver-
sion of Bayes’s theorem. With P as probability of, h the hypothesis under consideration, 
e as evidence, k as relevant background knowledge, ~ as not and | as given, we can enter 
our numerical estimates for the probabilities and run our calculation using Swinburne’s 
choice for expressing Bayes’s theorem:
(EG, 339).
P(h|e&k) means the probability that h is true given the evidence and background knowl-
edge. The numerator on the right side of the equation contains the product of what Swin-
burne refers to as the predictive power (EG, 56) of h (the likelihood that e will occur given 
h&k) and the probability of h being true given our background knowledge alone—that 
is, without taking into account the specific evidence included in e. P(h|k) is the prior 
probability of h, the probability of h being true when we do not take e into account. k 
houses our background knowledge/beliefs relevant to h. The denominator contains the 
product in the numerator plus the product of the likelihood of e existing if h is false and 
the likelihood of h being false on background knowledge alone. Under ideal circum-
stances, this will provide one with the answer to P(h|e&k), the posterior probability.
The basic idea behind Bayes’s theorem, especially as it is used by Swinburne and some 
other philosophers, is to try to isolate and estimate specific probabilities in an attempt 
to gain more clarity and precision when assessing hypotheses. Let us imagine that while 
writing this morning I hear in a room in my house a noise that sounds like something 
fell on the floor. I am, so far as I know, the only human in the house. I can assure you that 
I will not seriously entertain the hypothesis that a poltergeist is in my house. At least not 
at first. There is, however, some evidence that would be explained by the poltergeist hy-
pothesis: the noise in the room. Thus, P(e|h&k) will have some positive value. Why, then, 
would I be much more inclined to think about calling the police rather than a priest? 
The poltergeist hypothesis does not cohere with my prior knowledge—or what I think 
is knowledge, my prior background beliefs. In my experience and as a result of think-
ing about metaphysical possibilities as part of my job, I think it is highly unlikely that 
poltergeists exist. My estimate for the prior probability of the poltergeist hypothesis (i.e., 
what I believed about the existence of poltergeists prior to hearing the noise) will be very 
low. This allows me to gain a better sense of the probability of the poltergeist hypoth-
esis. I take the direct evidence and consider it in the context of my (hopefully justified) 
background beliefs. I now possess a better estimate for the probability of the poltergeist 
hypothesis than I would have if I only considered the direct evidence.
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There are also rival hypotheses to take into account. Perhaps a cat is in the room, or a 
mouse. Perhaps an air current has caught something that was not balanced well at the 
moment, and it has fallen on the floor. Maybe it is an intruder of the human sort. Now 
I no longer only have my background knowledge reducing the probability of the polter-
geist hypothesis; I have other rival hypotheses that could explain the evidence. At the 
moment, I am not too concerned about a poltergeist given my (I think) well-justified 
background beliefs and the existence of plausible alternative hypotheses.
Imagine that I am not deeply skeptical about the existence of things that go bump in 
the night (or day), that I am very open to paranormal phenomena. In this case, I may 
have a significantly different value for my prior probability. My background beliefs will 
be more amenable to the poltergeist hypothesis. This is an instance in which the use of 
Bayes’s theorem becomes problematic. In cases in which we do not have good, uniform 
numbers for our probability estimates—and cases such as these abound in philosophi-
cal speculation—two well-intentioned users can reach significantly different probability 
estimates for the same hypothesis. And given a person’s receptiveness to the poltergeist 
hypothesis, perhaps he or she will not be so inclined to propose alternative hypotheses 
to further contextualize the evidence.
2. Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy
In his book Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy (hereafter R),2 Swinburne makes the 
case for both the probability of there being a revelation if there is a God and that Chris-
tianity has the specific marks of a revelation from God. There is, he believes, a lower 
hurdle to jump for revealed theology if there is already evidence from natural theology 
that there is a God (R, 79–80), and he believes that he has shown in EG that it is more 
likely than not that God exists—and is all powerful, all knowing, and all good.
In Swinburne’s view we need a revelation (i) to further our knowledge of God’s nature (R, 
80), (ii) including knowledge about the incarnation of God and the atonement (R, 81), 
(iii) to provide encouragement for us to lead good and godly lives (R, 84–85), and most 
importantly (iv) to gain moral clarity on some matters when philosophical reason falls 
short (R, 85). But the revelation must not be too evident. It should be the case that, until 
it is pursued by someone embarking on the Christian path, the evidence will only be 
strong enough to make it probable that Christianity is a and the revelation from God. It 
is in a person’s further wholehearted pursuit that the revelation will become more prob-
able, like a treasure hid in the field (R, 97, 125, 343).
There are four tests for candidates for a revelation from God, says Swinburne. There 
2  Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007).
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must be (i) original content (R, 107) that does “not contain moral claims incompatible 
with any clear intuitions we have about what are the necessary truths of morality” (R, 
110), the revelation must be (ii) backed by an authenticating miracle (R, 107) (and only 
Christianity satisfied this condition, according to Swinburne [R, 126]), there must be 
(iii) a clear church that was faithful to the original revelation and developed its content 
plausibly, and it must be (iv) the kind of revelation one might expect God to give to hu-
mans (R, 108).
The Bible is an important, even central, part of the supposed Christian revelation. There 
is a difference between the strong view and the moderate view of interpreting the Bible. 
According to the strong view, God ensured that every sentence in the Bible forms part 
of a unit that is true; the moderate view allows for minor errors due to the leeway given 
to the authors—so only almost all sentences form parts of a unit that is true (R, 239–40). 
(Swinburne accepts the strong view.) Pre-Christian Israel had a limited understanding of 
the progressively revealed revelation, so the Old Testament must be interpreted in light 
of the New Testament (R, 240). To understand a passage straight means that it is applica-
ble to all; to understand it historically means that it applies only to those within that cul-
tural and historical context (R, 262). Whenever a passage cannot be interpreted straight 
or historically and be edifying—and there are some egregious examples of such passages 
(e.g., the slaughter of everything that has breath in Deuteronomy 7:1–2, slaughter plus 
enslaving others in 20:10–18, and dashing the little ones from Babylon against the rocks 
as revenge in Psalm 137:9)—it is to be interpreted metaphorically. This is the case even 
when the metaphorical interpretation must be “forced” on the passage(s) (R, 265).
Some examples of the reputed moral clarity provided by the Christian revelation follow. 
First, homosexuality, a sin and a disability, is wrong (R, 303–6). We would not “know” 
this without a revelation. Second, the husband as the head of the marriage is to settle 
disputes when agreement cannot be reached (R, 307). We would not “know” this without 
a revelation. Third, slavery is likely to be frowned upon by God, but historically it is not 
too problematic. Some (e.g., John Chrysostom) believed that a good reason for having 
one or two slaves is that the owner can show kindness to them (R, 326–27). In a more 
general sense, we learn from the Christian revelation that what we might normally con-
sider as supererogatory (e.g., loving one’s neighbor as oneself) is morally obligatory (R, 
292). We would not know that we should behave like this without a revelation.
Swinburne uses Bayes’s theorem to argue that, given the historical evidence we have 
about Jesus’s life and the evidence we have that an authenticating “super-miracle” (i.e., 
the resurrection) occurred, and given that this is just the sort of authentication we would 
expect from a revelation from God, “the probability on both the evidence of natural the-
ology and the historical evidence about Jesus and his Church, that there has been or will 
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ever be a revelation” is 125/128 or 0.9766 (R, 352). And since Jesus is the only prophet to 
clearly meet Swinburne’s criteria, the Christian revelation is almost certainly the revela-
tion from God. Apparently the treasure is hiding in plain sight.
Instrumental to Swinburne’s case in R is to consider recalcitrant data as potential deduc-
tions in P(e|h&k) rather than to consider problematic data of any kind in P(h|k). (In this 
section h is the revelation hypothesis.) In R, k consists only in Swinburne’s result in EG, 
that it is at least as likely as not that Swinburne’s hypothesis about God is true.
3. The Resurrection of God Incarnate
In his book The Resurrection of God Incarnate (hereafter RGI),3 Swinburne makes a case 
for the historical veracity of Jesus’s physical resurrection, wherein Jesus’s body was glori-
fied and reanimated on a Sunday morning and exited the tomb. Swinburne refers to this 
as a super-miracle, just the sort of thing one would expect if Jesus were God incarnate 
and lived among us.
He develops his argument in two stages. First, he assesses what he calls the prior histori-
cal evidence, which includes the evidence regarding the resurrection before the death of 
Jesus. Second, he assesses what he calls the posterior historical evidence, which includes 
evidence regarding the resurrection after the death of Jesus. He relies on what he refers 
to as the Principle of Testimony: In the absence of counterevidence, “we should believe 
what others tell us that they have done or perceived” (RGI, 12–13). Swinburne under-
stands the New Testament authors and witnesses as providing us, for the most part, with 
testimony.
In EG Swinburne concludes that the existence of God is more likely than not. He will use 
his understanding of God and the probability of God’s existence as indirectly confirming 
background evidence, the data populating k, and he will ultimately conclude that, once 
we add the detailed prior and posterior evidence, “the total evidence makes it probable 
that there is indeed a God who became incarnate in Jesus Christ and rose from the dead” 
(RGI, 5).
Why would God become incarnate and dwell among us? Swinburne offers three reasons: 
“to provide a measure of reconciliation with God for a broken relationship, to identify 
with our suffering, and to show and teach us how to live and to encourage us to do so” 
(RGI, 37). He states that he does not want to exaggerate his case, but he nonetheless 
comes up with an estimate of at least fifty percent that if there is a God of the type briefly 
defined above, this God will become incarnate as a human being at some point to iden-
3  Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003).
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tify with our suffering and for at least one of the other reasons provided (RGI, 50).
But this incarnation, according to Swinburne, will likely be a divided one, an incarnation 
consistent with what is known as the Chalcedonian definition. According to the Chalce-
donian interpretation of the incarnation, Jesus had two natures, one wholly divine and 
the other wholly human—but these two natures (mysteriously) united into one person, 
Jesus. Given this understanding of the incarnation, biblical content that appears to show 
Jesus unaware of certain things God would know can be explained (away) as content 
that it was unnecessary for Jesus to know given his particular mission and purpose. Jesus 
“could act and react in his human life with partial ignorance of, and so with only partial 
access to, his divine powers” (RGI, 51–52).
What would we expect an incarnate God of Swinburne’s conception to be like? What are 
the prior requirements for being God incarnate? Swinburne’s list consists of five marks: 
“His life must be, as far as we can judge, a perfect human life in which he provides heal-
ing; he must teach deep moral and theological truths (ones, in so far as we can judge, 
plausibly true); he must himself believe that he is God Incarnate; he must teach that his 
life provides an atonement for our sins; and he must found a church which continues 
his teaching and work. Let us call a prophet who does all this one who satisfies the prior 
requirements for being God Incarnate” (RGI, 59). Swinburne adds, “The prophet’s life 
needs to be signed by a super-miracle” (RGI, 62). The super-miracle is the resurrection.
The posterior evidence includes, of course, appearances of the risen Jesus. With the ex-
ception of the Gospel of Mark, the gospels include post-resurrection appearances of a 
risen Jesus. It is true that Jesus’s resurrected body can do fantastic things like appear or 
disappear suddenly and walk through walls, but he also eats and drinks and bears physi-
cal wounds from the crucifixion. In 1 Corinthians 15:1–8, Paul provides what appears to 
be a creedal statement regarding the sequence of appearances. (The nature of these ap-
pearances is not, however, distinguished from Paul’s vision. And what Paul experienced 
was evidently not a risen Jesus who looked like the Jesus who supposedly had a meal 
with his disciples after the resurrection.) Swinburne attempts to address the rather messy 
“testimony” regarding the appearances: the fact that not a single appearance is provided 
in the most ancient manuscripts of Mark and the fact that there are location conflicts 
in the other gospels related to the appearances (RGI, 76–77, 82). I will allow the reader 
of Swinburne to decide whether his attempt to harmonize the conflicts is plausible or 
amusing (RGI, 156, 158).
Another item of posterior evidence is the early tradition of Sunday as the day to celebrate 
the Eucharist, the common Christian meal. Choosing Sunday is something we might 
anticipate if there was something very early that marked this day as an important day, 
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something like the resurrection of Jesus (RGI, 165).
In an attempt to address and assess rival hypotheses to the hypothesis that Jesus rose 
physically from the dead, Swinburne tackles what he (apparently) considers to be the 
possible alternatives: misidentified tomb and theft. He concludes that it is unlikely that 
the women would have been mistaken about where Jesus’s tomb was, so it is probably 
not the case that Jesus’s tomb was thought to be empty because later visitations were to 
the wrong tomb (RGI, 176). Regarding theft, Swinburne accepts the story about the Ro-
man guard being placed at the tomb as historically plausible, an account found in the 
Gospel of Matthew and not attested elsewhere. Given the placement of the guard, theft 
is especially unlikely (RGI, 178).
Recall that the background evidence Swinburne includes in his calculation of the odds 
of the resurrection of God incarnate is the greater than fifty percent likelihood that there 
is a God as Swinburne understands It. This background evidence (if true) shows that it 
is likely that a God exists who could perform miracles and might have a good reason to 
become incarnate as a human being—i.e., to identify with our suffering, and so on. The 
prior evidence is assessed vis-à-vis a match with the list of “marks” of God incarnate, 
and clearly no other prophet in any religion has satisfied the criteria as well as Jesus. And 
when we add the posterior evidence of the appearances and the selection of Sunday as 
a day of worship, we have a very powerful case indeed! Swinburne’s calculation using 
Bayes’s theorem reaches the posterior probability of 100/103 that Jesus was God incarnate 
and rose physically from the dead (RGI, 213). According to Swinburne, if one wants 
to avoid this conclusion, “an objector will have to give very different values to some of 
the probabilities by means of which we have reached this result” (RGI, 214). Again, the 
Christian treasure is hiding in plain sight. Or is it?
4. Misuse of Prediction
We will begin our critical assessment by noting a peculiarity in both R and RGI: Swin-
burne does not appear to understand the nature of a prediction. As we have seen, Swin-
burne refers to P(e|h&k) as the predictive power of a hypothesis. In its rigorous sense in 
the sciences, a prediction is something that must be true if the hypothesis is true. The 
relationship can be formulated as a conditional: If h (hypothesis), then p (prediction). 
Modus tollens can thus have its say: if p turns out to be false, then (barring one or more 
plausible auxiliary hypotheses) h is false. If one is going to use a term like predictive 
power in a scientific or quasiscientific context, this should be our understanding.
Let us consider his list from RGI regarding the five marks (plus one) of an incarnate God. 
This time we will number each one for ease of discussion: (i) His life must be, as far as 
we can judge, a perfect human life in which he provides healing; (ii) he must teach deep 
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moral and theological truths; (iii) he must himself believe that he is God Incarnate; (iv) 
he must teach that his life provides an atonement for our sins; and (v) he must found 
a church which continues his teaching and work; (plus one): the prophet’s life must be 
signed by a super-miracle. Perhaps because these things seem reasonable to expect from 
Swinburne’s point of view, they are christened predictions. However, they are not predic-
tions, in spite of his repeated use of must.
The hypothesis is that God incarnates. Must it be the case that God incarnate would 
heal people? Of course not. It would not be necessary for God incarnate to perform any 
miracle at all. Perhaps God wants deep moral and theological truths to be received with-
out the added frill of miracles. Regarding deep truths, if God incarnated simply to die as 
a sacrifice, then there would be no need to teach deep truths; there is one simple one, the 
wisdom of the cross. And why must God incarnate necessarily know that it is God in-
carnate? Perhaps to identify with our suffering God incarnate did not allow Itself to have 
the knowledge of ultimate identity. Must God incarnate teach that God’s life provides 
atonement for sins? Of course not, but maybe It would if this is why (or a reason why) 
God incarnated. But absent the doctrines of traditional Christianity, there is insufficient 
reason to think that a sacrifice of God is required to restore our relationship with God. 
Must God incarnate found a church? We do not know. Other options are available if there 
were a need to provide information in a lasting form. Rather than allow a group of men to 
determine doctrine after God incarnate departs, perhaps making sure that one has some-
one like Plato around to record a few especially profound conversations would have been 
a better option. This approach is compatible with having churches—or something like 
them, due to the lack of ready access to books and illiteracy; but the churches need not 
take on the role of establishing doctrine, making claims of heresy, and so on. Finally, it is 
not the case that God incarnate must be the object of—or performer of—a super-miracle. 
This does appear to be a reasonable option, but it is not the only reasonable option. Once 
again, perhaps the words and deeds are to stand on their own, without frills.
Recall that (iv), (v), and the super-miracle are also stated in R as predictions of the rev-
elation hypothesis. Additional reputed predictions of the revelation hypothesis include 
providing encouragement and moral clarity. While it would not be surprising for God to 
reveal Itself and to do so for Swinburne’s given reasons and in Swinburne’s given ways, 
not one of his “predictions” actually must be the case if God incarnates. Again, Swin-
burne is using prediction as a designator for his theological and philosophical prejudices.
Other things equal, predictive success is more compelling as evidence than are mere 
speculative and culturally induced anticipations. When a prediction is successful, an at-
tempt to injure the hypothesis (perhaps beyond remedy) has been avoided. This virtue is 
in addition to any corroborating virtue a successful prediction will also possess. It is im-
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pressive when the clear predictions of a hypothesis, especially when they are many and 
significant, turn out to be true. Swinburne is quite impressed with the fact that only Jesus 
satisfies all of the marks of being God incarnate. And if the marks truly are predictions, 
we could understand the enthusiasm. However, there is not a prediction among them. In 
RGI Swinburne looks back at what Jesus did (as interpreted by traditional Christianity), 
and he christens some of what he did (or was reputed to have done) as predictions of the 
hypothesis God incarnates. We simply do not know what God incarnate would do. We 
do not know whether God would choose to incarnate as a human being. We are in no 
position to make predictions.
5. Inadequate Incorporation of Recalcitrant Data
Swinburne’s assessment of recalcitrant data is sometimes questionable. Does he accu-
rately assess the strength of the recalcitrant data? Furthermore, he tends to focus more 
on confirming evidence, in both his predictive-power estimates as well as his prior prob-
abilities, than he does on problematic evidence. In this section we will focus on three 
categories of recalcitrant data for both the revelation hypothesis and the resurrection 
hypothesis: morally troubling scriptural content, Jesus’s exorcistic ministry, and failed 
prophecies.
Regarding the supposed revelation, we find morally troubling content at times in the 
Old Testament. As referenced in section 2, three of these morally troubling passages are 
Deuteronomy 7:1–2, 20:10–18, and Psalms 137:9:
When the Lord your God brings you into the land that you are about to enter 
and occupy, and he clears away many nations before you—the Hittites, the 
Girgashites, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the 
Jebusites, seven nations mightier and more numerous than you—and when the 
Lord your God gives them over to you and you defeat them, then you must 
utterly destroy them. Make no covenant with them and show them no mercy 
(Deuteronomy 7:1–2).
Later in Deuteronomy we learn that those residing in cities outside of Canaan can be 
taken as slaves—and the men slaughtered if they resist:
When you draw near to a town to fight against it, offer it terms of peace. If it 
accepts your terms of peace and surrenders to you, then all the people in it shall 
serve you at forced labor. If it does not submit to you peacefully, but makes 
war against you, then you shall besiege it; and when the Lord your God gives 
it into your hand, you shall put all its males to the sword. You may, however, 
take as your booty the women, the children, livestock, and everything else in 
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the town, all its spoil. You may enjoy the spoil of your enemies, which the Lord 
your God has given you. Thus you shall treat all the towns that are very far 
from you, which are not the towns of the nations here. But as for the towns 
of these peoples that the Lord your God is giving you as an inheritance, you 
must not let anything that breathes remain alive. You shall annihilate them—
the Hittites and the Amorites, the Canaanites and the Perizzites, the Hivites 
and the Jebusites—just as the Lord your God has commanded, so that they may 
not teach you to do all the abhorrent things that they do for their gods, and you 
thus sin against the Lord your God (Deuteronomy 20:10–18).
Such commands and permissions do not appear to be consistent with many of our con-
sidered judgments about what is right and just. The slaughter of children, infants, and 
even sheep—lest the sheep mislead them?—is morally troubling to most of us. Slavery 
is also something that we have come to recognize as being morally abhorrent. And yet it 
is clearly permitted by God. Perhaps we must acknowledge that, given the time and cir-
cumstances under which the people of Israel were fighting for existence and autonomy, 
behavior like this was generally accepted and expected. It is nonetheless morally trou-
bling. One should expect more from the Judge of all the earth.
Psalm 137 celebrates revenge upon Babylon, by dashing their little children against a 
rock: “O daughter Babylon, you devastator! Happy shall they be who pay you back what 
you have done to us! Happy shall they be who take your little ones and dash them against 
the rock!” (Psalm 137:8–9). Once again, Swinburne will agree with those who force a 
metaphorical interpretation on this passage:
What the modern world has forgotten is that the Church, which followed 
Irenaeus and subsequent Church Fathers in proclaiming the Old Testament 
to be Scripture, also followed the way which he initiated in interpreting in 
metaphorical senses any passages of that Testament which were not edifying 
if taken in straight or historical senses. As noted above, Irenaeus himself tends 
to assume that all such passages are to be understood in straight or historical 
ways, even if they had also a more important metaphorical meaning. But his 
successors took the logical step of maintaining that these passages had only 
a metaphorical meaning (or more than one metaphorical meaning). This 
metaphorical meaning is a meaning forced on the passage, not by considerations 
of the need to make sense of that passage of the biblical book taken on its own, 
but by the need to make sense of it as part of a Christian Scripture. (R, 265)
Those of us who do not understand how it is a “logical step” to “force” a metaphorical 
meaning on a passage clearly not intended as metaphor may be excused when we inter-
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pret the passages differently. Swinburne will force a metaphorical interpretation on the 
passages, but he will also argue that, since God gives and preserves the gift of life, God 
may take it at will or command someone else to take it (R, 271). Swinburne cannot lose. 
But we are not him. The monstrous nature of the commands and permissions should 
register as recalcitrant data for the revelation hypothesis. Since Jesus’s work is suppos-
edly a further unfolding of God’s revelation, it is also recalcitrant data for the resurrec-
tion hypothesis, physical or otherwise. This is data we might choose to consider within 
k when assessing P(h|k) for the resurrection hypothesis. Some Christian apologists have 
claimed that it is an unwarranted commitment to (or faith in) metaphysical naturalism 
that stands in the way of seeing the true value of the evidence for many Christian claims, 
especially the physical resurrection of Jesus. But this certainly need not be the case. One 
may posit the likelihood of the existence of a supernatural being capable of performing a 
resurrection and still conclude that Jesus was neither a nor the subject of a resurrection.
How are we to understand these morally troubling passages? One way, I think the more 
honest and plausible way, is to admit what appears to many of us to be obvious. The 
Bible, taken as a whole, is not an unfolding revelation. It is a compilation of somewhat 
related writings containing some of the ways in which God and God’s works were un-
derstood at particular times and places and through various regional influences histo-
rians can often identify. The best explanation for the content in the Christian Bible is 
an anthropogenic one. And this is true not only for moral values, but for the supposed 
revelation in general. The world was not created as it says in Genesis, in either version of 
creation. There was no worldwide flood a few thousand years ago. There is nothing in the 
reputed revelation that stands out as a type of interesting and accurate view about nature, 
including human nature (e.g., the nature of stars, biology [and in particular evolution], 
the reason why there are different languages, and so on) that one might anticipate from 
a revelation. There is a clear evolution from monolatry to monotheism in the Old Tes-
tament, something one would anticipate from an anthropogenic evolution rather than 
from a revelation.
There is something missing from Swinburne’s list of “marks” that we might expect to 
find there. Given the prevalence of Jesus’s role as an exorcist in the Synoptic Gospels (i.e., 
Matthew, Mark, and Luke), one wonders why he did not include casting out demons in 
his list of marks. Jesus cast out seven demons from Mary Magdalene (Mark 16:9; Luke 
8:2). That is a lot of demons. Jesus was not the only wonder-worker in the region per-
forming exorcisms,4  but he was clearly one of them. Unlike his healing ministry absent 
demonic possession, Jesus used verbal commands to accompany the casting out of de-
4  Geza Vermes, The Changing Faces of Jesus (New York: Penguin Compass, 2002), 171–72.
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mons.5 According to Geza Vermes, “one of the chief aspects of Jesus’ function as a healer 
in the Synoptics, namely, the casting out of demons who were blamed for every kind of 
illness, is completely missing from John. For such a practice smacked of popular religion, 
if not of magic, and as such was considered unworthy of the Johannine Jesus.”6 Might 
embarrassment also explain why Swinburne does not include one of the most prominent 
activities of Jesus’s ministry in the Synoptics among his marks of God incarnate?
Recall my use of the poltergeist hypothesis in section 1. I relied upon my background 
knowledge (or, rather, a belief that I consider justified) regarding poltergeists: It is highly 
unlikely that poltergeists exist. My strong disbelief in poltergeists is contained in my 
prior probability, and it reduces the posterior probability of the poltergeist hypothesis 
considerably. I think that many of us will estimate the hypothesis that demons exist and 
sometimes possess people to be about as likely as the existence of poltergeists. We are as 
skeptical about things that go bump in the body as we are about things that go bump in 
the night! For us it is meet to include our doubts about demonic possession in our prior 
probabilities relating to the revelation hypothesis and by extension the resurrection hy-
pothesis. There is a very small chance that demons exist and possess humans—or swine. 
We could reasonably anticipate (but not predict) that God incarnate (or a close associ-
ate) would know this. Hence, we could reasonably anticipate that God incarnate (or a 
close associate) would not engage in exorcistic practices.
Let us now turn our attention to failed prophecies. The situation in this regard is so des-
perately bad that it alone might be understood to refute the revelation hypothesis. One of 
the most blatant examples is Jesus’s prophecy in Mark 13. If this chapter accurately rep-
resents Jesus’s words, he prophesied that the Son of Man will come in power and glory 
in the clouds, and that the angels will gather the elect from the earth and heavens, and 
that this will happen before the generation then living passes away. This, of course, did 
not occur. Swinburne, ever resourceful, attempts to soften the blow regarding prophecies 
that fail to occur:
The tradition of reinterpretation of biblical prophecy in the light of history is 
itself a biblical tradition. Daniel 9 reinterprets Jeremiah’s talk of ‘seventy years’ 
(Jer. 2:12) as seventy ‘weeks of years’; 2 Esdras 12:11–2 reinterprets Daniel 7:17. 
Those in the tradition would not have been unduly disconcerted to discover 
that in its original context the Book of Daniel prophesied an ‘end’ in the second 
century BC, or that the Book of Revelation prophesied an ‘end’ in the second 
5  Ibid., 169.
6  Ibid., 13.
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century A.D. They would have reflected that the meaning of the prophecies was 
something other than the original understanding of them; and that time would 
show what the meaning was. Perhaps too, the literal ‘failure’ of the prophecy 
makes clear that all prophecy is warning, not prediction; and maybe that 
warning was heeded by someone (R, 275–76).
This is, in my view, an implausible attempt at harmonization akin to forcing metaphors 
on egregiously immoral passages (whether or not they are understood straight or his-
torically). Some may claim that the quantity or quality of successful prophecies mitigates 
the problem of seemingly failed prophecies. This tack will not work, for there is not a sin-
gle success among the prophecies broadly construed that defies naturalistic explanation.
As mentioned previously in this section, there is no reason for the skeptic to rely on 
metaphysical naturalism as background knowledge for assessing the revelation hypoth-
esis or the resurrection hypothesis. Features internal to the supposed revelation itself will 
provide ample reason for a low prior probability.
6. Ignoring Plausible Rival Hypotheses
In Swinburne’s version of Bayes’s theorem, he maintains that P(e|~h&k) must include 
the sum of the probabilities of all of the alternative hypotheses. However, Swinburne 
does not consider at least two of the alternative hypotheses to the physical resurrection 
hypothesis in RGI. He includes only the possibility of the women misidentifying the 
tomb in which Jesus was placed and the possibility of theft of Jesus’s body. He rejects the 
theft hypotheses abruptly, and he does so in part because he accepts the dubious claim, 
only occurring in Matthew 27:64–66, that Pontius Pilate ordered the tomb to be sealed 
and guarded (RGI 178). Regarding the women misidentifying the tomb, he dismisses the 
hypothesis abruptly by relying on yet another passage that only appears in Matthew stat-
ing that Jewish critics claimed that the disciples stole the body. If the tomb had not been 
correctly identified, then why would this accusation make any sense?
One hypothesis that Swinburne ignores is what I will call the legend hypothesis. The 
Gospel of Mark is our earliest gospel and our earliest source containing a narrative struc-
ture of Jesus’s preaching career. There is good reason to believe that the original ending 
of Mark is at 16:8. If the authors of Luke and Matthew borrowed the empty-tomb story 
from Mark, and if it is the case that the author(s) of John indirectly rely on Mark, then 
we have, at its origin, a thin account indeed. In Mark, three women are going to the 
tomb on Sunday morning to anoint Jesus’s corpse. The author makes it clear that they are 
unaccompanied by one or more men (Mark 16:2). There is a man at the tomb, dressed 
in white, who tells them that Jesus is no longer in the tomb and that he will appear in 
Galilee. The women flee out of fear, and they do not say anything to anyone (Mark 16:8). 
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The end. Perhaps their silence was necessary to explain why the physical departure of 
Jesus’s reanimated body from a tomb was not an aspect of preaching or doctrine in early 
Christian communities. It is instead a legend that developed over time. A thorough ex-
plication and defense of the legend hypothesis will be found in Richard C. Carrier’s “The 
Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb,” in The Empty Tomb: Jesus 
Beyond the Grave.7
Another hypothesis that Swinburne does not consider is the temporary-burial hypoth-
esis (sometimes called the reburial hypothesis). According to the historical sources we 
have addressing burial practices close to the time in which Jesus lived and was executed, 
Jesus, a blasphemer according to the Jewish Council, would not have been buried in a 
private or family tomb. Instead, his burial would be an ignoble one in the graveyard for 
criminals. Given the fact that the Sabbath was drawing nigh and sufficient time to move 
Jesus’s body to the criminals’ graveyard was lacking, Jesus’s corpse could have been tem-
porarily stored in a tomb or other appropriate location until work could legally resume 
after the Sabbath. By Sunday morning, the temporary tomb or storage locale would no 
longer contain Jesus’s corpse. Add visions, commitment to a way and man, searching the 
scriptures, and a lack of clarity about the ultimate resting place of Jesus’s corpse, and it 
would be possible to manufacture a new religion based on the physical resurrection of 
Jesus. A more thorough explication and defense of this hypothesis can be found in Rich-
ard C. Carrier’s “The Burial of Jesus in Light of Jewish Law,” in The Empty Tomb.8
The two hypotheses we briefly considered above are not, of course, without their prob-
lems. Recalcitrant data is to be taken into account for all five of the hypotheses related 
to the resurrection that we have discussed in this review: physical resurrection, mis-
identified tomb, theft, legend, and temporary burial. One is often left with the challenge 
of assessing rival hypotheses in part by considering the strengths of the corroborations 
against the recalcitrant data for each rival.
7. Swinburne’s Use of Bayes’s Theorem in RGI
Let us get into the weeds to some extent with Swinburne’s use of Bayes’s theorem in RGI. 
Recall that Swinburne’s conclusion regarding the physical resurrection—specifically that 
God became incarnate in Jesus and physically rose from the dead—is an astonishing 
7  Richard C. Carrier, “The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb,” in The Empty 
Tomb: Jesus beyond the Grave, edited by Robert M. Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder (New York: Prometheus 
Books, 2005), 105–231. 
8  Richard C. Carrier, “The Burial of Jesus in Light of Jewish Law,” in The Empty Tomb: Jesus beyond the 
Grave, edited by Robert M. Price and Jeffery Jay Lowder (New York: Prometheus Books, 2005), 369–92.
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100/103. How does he get there? First, rather than assessing the resurrection hypothesis 
and the evidence relevant to this hypothesis, he attempts to assess a hypothesis combin-
ing both the incarnation hypothesis and the resurrection hypothesis:
Let e be the detailed historical evidence, consisting of a conjunction of three 
pieces of evidence (e1&e2&e3). e1 is the [prior historical evidence regarding 
what God Incarnate must do and how Jesus satisfied the list quite well]. e2 is the 
detailed historical evidence relating to the Resurrection. . . . e3 is the evidence... 
that neither the prior nor the posterior requirements for being God Incarnate 
were satisfied in any prophet in human history in any way comparably with the 
way in which they were satisfied in Jesus (R, 210).
e1 and e3 will make it highly unlikely that any other prophet besides Jesus will satisfy the 
complete evidence set e1, e2, and e3. In the remainder of this section, r will stand for the 
hypothesis that Jesus rose physically from the dead, i will stand for the hypothesis that 
God became incarnate in Jesus, and c will stand for the combination of r and i. We have 
seen in section 4 that e1 is not robust evidence at all, for it consists of prejudices errone-
ously christened predictions. It is not a surprising coincidence that Jesus satisfies all of 
the “musts” on the list better than other prophets; the list was made with Jesus in mind. 
Given that e1 and e3 obviously select i and thus c, r is along for the ride. Since c will allow 
no rivals we can muster (for the rivals Swinburne discusses are rivals to r, not c, and e1 
specifically selects i), including r in c as a stowaway hypothesis does not appear to allow 
for a legitimate assessment of r.
Second, Swinburne fails to include relevant recalcitrant data in his prior probability. For 
Swinburne, the problem of evil serves as the only factor problematic for c:
To avoid my conclusion, an objector will have to give very different values to 
some of the probabilities by means of which we have reached this result. He 
may claim that the evidence of natural theology (for example, because of the 
phenomenon of natural evil—pain caused by natural processes) makes it very 
unlikely that there is a God; and/or that if there is a God, he is (despite my 
arguments) very unlikely to become incarnate. So he will assert a value for [the 
prior probability P(h|k)] well below the value of 1/4 which I give to it. But if he 
leaves intact all the other values I have suggested, except in so far as they are 
functions of [P(h|k)], he would have to ascribe a value of slightly less than 1/100 
. . . to get the probability of h on (e&k) below 1/2 (R, 214).
In section 5 we addressed three categories of recalcitrant data for the revelation hypoth-
esis—and by extension c, i, and r: morally troubling scriptural content, Jesus’s exorcis-
tic ministry, and failed prophecies. There is no reason to rely solely or mainly on the 
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problem of evil for recalcitrant data relevant to our prior probabilities. Swinburne does 
discuss morally troubling scriptural content, Jesus’s exorcistic ministry, and apparently 
failed prophecies, but he appears to think that his attempts at mollifying the force of 
these recalcitrant data suffice for exclusion as recalcitrant input into his use of Bayes’s 
theorem, including his prior probability for c. It is my view that, by attempting to dull the 
force of the three categories of recalcitrant data internal to the supposed revelation itself, 
Swinburne has made the problems salient and, given the implausibility of his attempts 
at harmonization, intractable. Problems do not vanish simply because an explanation is 
proffered, regardless of plausibility.
Third, as well as failing to include the legend hypothesis and the temporary-burial hy-
pothesis as rivals to c, he does not include the two hypotheses he does consider as rivals 
to c. In his discussion regarding the denominator, he simply asserts 1/1000 as the prob-
ability for some prophet satisfying both the prior and the posterior “requirements” (R, 
213). Furthermore, he does not follow his own rule: P(e|~h&k) is to be determined by 
the sum of the probability estimates of the rival hypotheses. Swinburne merely states 
the vague hypothesis that someone other than Jesus explains e1, e2, and e3, and he as-
serts, without any tether to a rationale, that we should settle on 1/1000 (R, 213). Granted, 
the rival hypotheses are only rivals to r in the context of receiving support from e2, the 
posterior evidence. But the dubious prior evidence, the evidence for i, so clearly picks 
out Jesus that there really cannot be a serious rival to c. Again, the stowaway status of r 
in c allows Swinburne to ignore rivals specific to r in his denominator. This increases the 
probability of c and by association r without the significant reduction in probability that 
would occur if r had to contend with its rivals.
Let us consider a case for r alone with e2, the posterior evidence, as our direct evidence 
(hereafter e). Will this allow us to accurately estimate probabilities? I think the answer is 
clearly no. It is not as if we have accurate information regarding the frequency of physical 
resurrections among the entire set of charismatic men and women. We also do not know, 
for example, the frequency in which tombs were misidentified under emotional, harried 
circumstances. And so on. But assessing r by itself will allow us to more accurately decide 
what counts as evidence and rival hypotheses.
Regarding the case for r, if we were to posit numbers for probabilities at least as defen-
sible as those put forward by Swinburne, would the posterior probability change that 
much? What is the probability of a person rising from the dead sans the specific pos-
terior evidence in Jesus’s case? Frequency cannot be determined here, for there is no 
publicly known case of a single resurrection. Nonetheless, to be generous I will give a 
prior probability of 1/1000 for r. Given the recalcitrant data we have covered, we can allow 
for a probability of 1/2 for the existence of a supernatural being capable of performing 
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a physical resurrection and nonetheless think that Jesus would not have been a candi-
date for such a miracle, given the deficiencies internal to the supposed revelation within 
which Jesus was embedded. I will estimate the probability of e for each rival as 1/100. I will 
estimate the probability of e given r as 1/5, a lot more generous than Swinburne’s 1/10 for 
c. With P(e|r&k)=1/5, P(r|k)=1/1000, and P(e|~r&k)=1/25, the posterior probability of r is 
about 1/200, a lot less than Swinburne’s 100/103 for c.
I have no confidence that the posterior probability above is even approximately correct. I 
believe that r is far less probable than 1/200. But I am confident that the inordinately gener-
ous estimates show that higher posterior probabilities will require something other than 
disinterested philosophical work.
8. Summary
It is clear that Swinburne’s probability estimates (and hence posterior probability conclu-
sions) are highly questionable, and this is largely due to the misunderstanding of cultural 
biases as predictions, the inadequate incorporation of recalcitrant data, and, in RGI, the 
lack of an appropriate consideration of rival hypotheses. I by no means wish to suggest 
that Bayes’s theorem is useless or necessarily prone to engender hyperbolic probabilistic 
results. But given subjective judgments regarding inclusion or exclusion in our probabil-
ity estimates, and our subjective estimates for what we do include, the danger is lurking. 
Bayes’s theorem can be useful in philosophical speculation in that it focuses one’s atten-
tion on the right sorts of things: the nature and quality of the direct evidence, relevant 
background knowledge/beliefs, and potential alternative hypotheses. Still, as we have 
seen, unless one has reliable probabilities to enter into Bayes’s theorem (as is sometimes 
the case in assessing medical hypotheses, for example), using the theorem and generat-
ing a posterior probability in numerical form might have the unfortunate consequence 
of providing unwarranted confidence.
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